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EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW
MICHAEL J. HINDELANG
The author received his A.B. in psychology from Wayne State University in 1966, his M.A. in social psychology from the same institution in 1967. He also holds a 1968 master's degree in criminology
from the University of California (Berkeley), at which university he is presently a candidate for a
doctorate in criminology.
At the School of Criminology he has been affiliated with three research projects, the most recent of
which deals with drug use in the Haight-Ashbury section of San Francisco. His doctoral dissertation
concerns personality attributes of self-reported delinquents.
With increasing frequency the question has been raised as to whether or not defendants receive
differential judicial treatment as a function of their race. The present article reviews the empirical
studies that have addressed themselves to this question and attempts to reconcile their divergent

findings in the light of temporal, geographical, and methodological variability across studies.
On the facade of the Supreme Court building in
Washington, D.C., the words "Equal Justice
Under Law" stand out in large marble letters.
For many decades, but most noticeably in the last
decade, many have maintained that "Equal Justice
Under Law" is nothing but a facade for certain
segments of our population. Many critics1 have
put forth the hypothesis that justice in the United
States, as it has been and as it is still being administered, is not free of bias. More specifically,
they have hypothesized that a significant minority
within our citizenry receives differential treatment
even within the context of the judiciary of the
United States. This minority is, of course, the
American Negro.
It has been maintained that equal justice for
Negroes, even under the law, has more often been
an ideal than a reality. More than three centuries
ago the Negro was brought to this country in a
position of subservience. Although many Negroes
have tried to raise themselves from this position,
they have been consistently and systematically
denied the opportunity in many spheres of activity.
The attempt to subvert the Negro's endeavor to
improve himself has not been undertaken solely by
the stereotypical southern bigot. Even among the
framers of the Constitution there were those who
preferred to see the Negro remain in a position of
social, economic, and political subordinance.
I Bullock, Significance of the Racial Factor in the
length of Prison Sentence, 52 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S.
411-17 (1961); Vines & Jacob, Studies in Judicial
Politics, in VIII TuLANE SrTurms N PouncAL
ScrENcE 77-98 (1963); LEMEiT & ROSENBERG, THE
AmINIsTRATION Or JUSTICE TO MiNORiTy GRouPs IN
Los ANGELES CouNTY (1948).

Miller points out that James Madison said that
it was "wrong to admit, in the Constitution, that
there could be property in man"; so the Constitution makes no mention of slaves, slavery, or race.
Yet the Constitution protected slavery in states in
which it existed. It provided for the return of
slaves to their masters, devised a formula for
counting slaves in the apportionment for members
of Congress, prohibited Congress from taxing
slavery out of existence, and preserved the African
slave trade for twenty years. Furthermore, the
slave trade and taxing clauses could not even be
amended before 1808.2 These provisions within the
Constitution are certainly dissonant with the
proposition upon which much of the American system was founded-that "all men are created
equal".
In the 1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sanford, the
Supreme Court of the United States was given an
opportunity to delineate the civil status of the
Negro in America. Chief Justice Taney affirmed
that the Constitution was made by and for white
men. It was the opinion of his Court that Negroes
"were not intended to be included under the word
'citizen' in the Constitution, and can therefore
claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of
the United States".' Nothing could have been
more clear. The Negro was not a citizen of the
United States, and consequently he had none of
the rights of the citizens of this country.
Within this same decision, the Supreme Court
2Miller, Race, Poverty, and the Law, 44 CA=E. L.
REv. 388 (1966).
3Scott v. Sanford, 245 U.S. 197 (1857).
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further declared that it was the privilege and duty
of the separate states, rather than that of the
central government to legislate and enumerate the
civil rights of the Negroes within its boundaries.
Thus, the fate of the Negro was placed squarely in
the hands of the states.
Given these attitudes held by some of the
legislators (framers) and by at least a majority of
the Supreme Court in 1857, one need not strain to
understand how the Negro was relegated to the
role of a second-class citizen.
There were, however, many Americans who
disagreed with the Taney Court; there began a
movement, in effect, to reverse this state of affairs.
In 1865, less than ten years after the Dred Scott
decision, President Lincoln was instrumental in
bringing about the abolition of slavery.4 In the
following year, Congress drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment, and by 1868 three-fourths of the
states had ratified it.5 In effect, this amendment
was a reversal of the earlier Dred Scott decision.
It made former slaves citizens and gave them full
civil rights. Also, this amendment gave back to
the central government some of the powers that
the Dred Scott decision had given up to the states.
That is:
No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
0
protection of the laws.
Finally, in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment proclaimed that the right of any citizen to vote could
not be abridged or denied because of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.7
These three amendments removed the support
that the Constitution (and thus the nation) had
previously given to the proponents of slaves,
slavery, and racism. These amendments reversed
the interpretation of the Constitution that the
Supreme Court had earlier proclaimed concerning
the civil rights of Negroes. At this point every
American was constitutionally equal. Unfortunately, however, the second-class stigma that
had come to be associated with the Negro was not
soon to be forgotten. Thirteen years of legislation
4 U.S. CoNsT.

Amend. XIII.

5Id. amend. XIV.
6Ibi.

7

Id. amend. XV.

could hardly be expected to effectively blot out two
hundred years of precedent.
When the problem of the Negro in his quest for
equality is placed within this historical framework,
it is not at all difficult to understand his plight
today. It was much easier for the Civil War amendments to reverse the law that had been laid down
by the Supreme Court thirteen years before than
it was for white Americans to reverse their traditional perceptions of the Negro inAmerican society.
For many of us this reversal has not even come
about one hundred years later.
In addition to being black, the Negro faces
another severe problem-he is also generally poor.
Any phenomenon that affects the poor as a group
will include a disproportionate number of Negroes
because a disproportionate number of Negroes live
below the poverty line in the United States.8
Being poor puts one at a distinct disadvantage
in any type of court action within the courts of the
United States. It is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to be afforded true justice in the United
States without strong financial support. Beginning
with the very first steps in the judicial process, it
is necessary to have benefit of counsel if one expects
to be victorious. The intricacies and subtleties of
the law demand it. Even if one has expert knowledge of the law, it may be unwise of him to undertake his own defense. When Clarence Darrow, one
of the finest criminal lawyers in the history of the
United States, was being prosecuted for trying to
fix a jury, he immediately recognized the fact that
he needed a good lawyer. 9
As a defendant, the poor man is at an obvious
disadvantage. Often he does not have benefit of
counsel during the initial interrogation, 0 during
which many confessions are still made. Then he is
usually unable to post bail, so he is held in custody
pending trial. During this time he is unable to help
himself at all by doing the necessary sleuthing to
help to prove his innocence. He is likewise unable
to hire anyone else to act in his behalf. Finally, at
the trial, his attorney frequently is no legal match
for the experienced (or even the inexperienced)
prosecutor. If he is convicted by the judge or jury,
the defendant usually has a right to an appeal to a
8
Address by Lyndon Johnson, Howard University,
June 4, 1965, cited in Miller, supra note 2.
9LEwis, GmEoN's TRumPET 171 (1964).
10This is true at least in minor offenses, and often
in major offenses, in spite of the recent Court rulings.
See SKOLN cK, Jusnca WrmouT TRAL 145-47 (1966),
for an example of police circumvention of constitutional
requirements.
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higher court. However, if the defendant is unaware
of this right and he fails to appeal, the case goes no
further. Assuming that the defendant becomes
aware of his right to appeal, he may file for an
appeal. But in order to do this successfully, the
defendant must have some legal basis for an appeal.
Without legal assistance, it is unlikely that the
defendant will find legal grounds for an appeal.
And so, the financial status of the defendant can
be a determining factor in whether he is convicted
or acquitted.
Through the combined efforts of the judicial and
legislative branches of the governments on all levels
this inequity has begun to be remedied. In Betts v.
Brady" the Supreme Court, in 1942, decided that a
lawyer was constitutionally required only if to be
tried without one amounted to a "denial of fundamental fairness". To prove that he was denied
"fundamental fairness", the poor man had to
demonstrate that he was the victim of what the
Court called "special circumstances". These might
include his own illiteracy, ignorance, youth, or
mental illness, the complexity of the charge against
him, or the conduct of the prosecutor or the judge
at the trial."2 In this decision the Court made it
perfectly clear that this provision of counsel would
be made as a matter of right only in those cases
where "special circumstances" existed. After
twenty years of explaining and expanding these
"special circumstances", the Court finally, in 1963,
reversed itself in Gideon v. Wainwright." This
decision proclaimed that an indigent would have
access to counsel in state criminal trials. In the
4
1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme
Court extended this provision to include the availability of counsel during interrogation. Through
Supreme Court decisions, the indigent defendant
is now in a position where he has the right to
counsel from the time he becomes a prime suspect"
through final appeal. Although the Court has not
clearly enumerated what types of offenses are to
be included in these decisions, the impact on the
legal profession is obvious.
This increased demand for legal services has
been met through the creation of public and private
defender systems; 6 and more recently through the
" Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 462 (1942).
1LEwis, op. cit. supra note 9, at 8.
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"Gideon
4
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
IsEscebedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1'BRowNELL, LEGAL Am IN TH UNITED STATES
126-34 (1951).
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public-private system,17 which is privately administered but supported through both public and
private funds. In 1960 there were nearly twice as
many citizens with access to the services of a
Defender's office than there had been in the previous decade."8 Today an indigent, or a person of less
than adequate means, may qualify for legal aid
through the services of legal aid clinic, lawyer
referral plans, neighborhood law offices, public and
private defenders, and court assigned lawyers."
Although these recent developments have been
a giant step in the direction of equal justice for all,
regardless of economic class, the rich and the poor
defendant are still not afforded the same probability of being given equally harsh sentences. In
a study of 2,955 felony convictions in Detroit's
Recorder's Court,20 it was found that of those who
were able to make bail, 17% received prison sentences while the remaining 83% received nonprison sentences. (Non-prison sentences include
probation and probation with a brief jail sentence
at the beginning of probation.) Among those who
had not been able to make bail, 67.5% received
prison sentences while only 32.5% received nonprison sentences (X2 = 683, p < .001).
These figures are somewhat confounded by the
fact that judges appear to set the bail higher in
cases where the state has a strong case (e.g., where
there were several witnesses, or the defendant was
caught in the act). Thus, the same set of circumstances that result in the bail being made more
difficult for the accused to make may also increase
the probability that he will be convicted. The
discrepancy is sufficiently large, however, to warrant further investigation of the hypothesis that at
least some of the disparity between the treatment
of offenders who had been able to make bail and the
treatment of those who had not been able to make
bail is the result of the differential economic status
of the defendants making up the two groups.
Further support for the hypothesis that the
relative wealth of the defendant may be a factor
which determines the harshness of the treatment
which is afforded him, is provided by another
finding in the Detroit study. It was found that of
17Id. at 14.
18Id. at 12.

29 MORELAND, EQUAL JusTicE UNDER LAW 74-77
(1957).
20 Saul R. Levin Memorial Foundation, Inc., Report of Study of Recorder's Court over 20-month
Period, November 1, 1957 through June 30, 1959 (unpublished mimeograph).
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the defendants who had private counsel, 28%
received prison sentences while the remaining 72%
received non-prison sentences. On the other hand,
of those defendants who had court-appointed
counsel 57% received prison sentences and only
43% received non-prison sentences (X2 = 222, p
< .001). That is, a defendant who is unable to
secure private counsel is twice as likely to receive
a straight prison sentence as a defendant who is
able to secure private counsel. Since most jurisdictions require that a defendant demonstrate his
indigence in order to obtain a court-appointed
counsel, the foregoing figures would seem to indicate that poor defendants receive significantly
harsher sentences than those relatively less poor
defendants who are able to retain private counsel.
Since "being black" is so highly correlated with
being poor,2 it is impossible to appreciate the
magnitude of the Negro's plight in our courts
without being aware of the disadvantages of being
a poor defendant, for any conditions affecting the
poor will disproportionately affect the Negro.
Thus, the Negro is a victim of dual circumstances.
"He is poor and black in a world that is attuned to
the needs of the affluent and white".?2 Bearing this
in mind, let us examine some of the studies that
have tried to assess whether or not Negroes are
treated equally before the courts in the United
States.
Vines and Jacob,2n in their study of more than
4,000 cases dealt with by the court in Orleans
Parish (New Orleans), Louisiana, found an interesting pattern of differential treatment afforded
white and Negro defendants. The authors used
two measures of harshness of treatment: dismissal
rate, and the percentage of offenders sentenced to
a year or more in prison. It was found that in 1954,
the year in which the Supreme Court took a giant
step in the direction of civil rights for the Negro,
defendants of both races received nearly equal
treatment at the hands of the judiciary. It was
found that discrepancies in the dismissal rates25 of
whites and Negroes accused of crimes had grown
steadily from an insignificant 1.6% in 1954 to
13.8% more dismissals for whites in 1958. This
discrepancy represents a significantly (p < .05)
21 Miller,
21 Id. at

supra note 2.
392.
134 Vines & Jacob, op. clt-supra note 1, at 77-98.
2 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Dismissal rates represents the percentage of cases
in which the defendant has been charged and apprehended, but for some reason the prosecution discontinues the action.

more harsh treatment of Negroes accused of crimes
in Orleans Parish in the sense that a greater percentage of Negroes had to face trial or punishment
(through'a plea of guilty) more frequently than
whites. When the percentage of defendants sentenced to a year or more of prison for all crimes is
used as the dependent variable, a strikingly similar
pattern emerges. The discrepancies between the
percentages of Negro and white defendants sentenced to a year or more in prison increased
monotonically from an insignificant 2.8% in 1954
to a significant 13.5% in 1960 (p < .05). However,
as the authors point out, if Negroes were committing more serious crimes than their white
counterparts, then more severe punishments would
be appropriate. An examination of specific categories of crimes "demonstrates that even when we
hold the offense-type constant, Negroes often
received heavier penalities than whites". Although
Negroes receive harsher treatment in 70% of the
categories examined, the authors unfortunately do
not provide any statistical test of the significance
of this finding.26
Several investigators have been interested more
specifically in whether differential treatment is
meted out not simply as a function of the race of
the offender, but as a function of the racial composition of the offender-victim dyad. The first of these
studies was carried out using court statistics available for murder indictments in North Carolina,
Georgia, and Virginia between 1930 and 1940.2 In
this study Johnson tested the hypothesis that the
order of severity of treatment by the court, from
most to least severe, would be as follows: (1)
Negro offender with a white victim (NW), (2)
white offender with a white victim (WW), (3)
Negro offender with a Negro victim (NN), (4)
white offender with a Negro victim (WN). The
rationale that he used for this prediction is that the
white power structure would be primarily concerned with protecting white interests. Those in
power could not let the Negro get away with stepping out of line by daring to harm a white man; to
a lesser extent, whites who harmed whites also had
to be dealt with. If a Negro harmed a Negro
though, the white court was not likely to be overly
upset. Finally, if a white man harmed a Negro
there were likely to be extenuating circumstances;
the Negro may have "sassed" a white man or
"6Vines & Jacob, op. cit. supra note 1, Tables 8, 9,
& 10.
2Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 271 Awa'Ars 93
(1941).
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3,644 Negro and white prisoners at Texas State
Prison who had been committed for burglary, rape,
and murder. He found that several non-racial
factors exert an influence on the length of sentence
given. The factors that are among these are the
type of offense, the nature of the plea, and the
number of previous felonies. Bullock found that as
the Texas Penal Code directs, a significantly more
severe penalty (X2 = 522, p < .001) is given for the
crimes of murder and rape than for the crime of
burglary. In addition, those who plead guilty
receive significantly shorter sentences (X2 = 212,
p < .001) than those who plead not guilty. The
Penal Code, however, does not provide that this
factor should affect sentencing. Finally, the number of previous felonies has no significant effect on
the length of prison sentence. Besides these legal
factors, other non-legal factors affected the length
of sentence imposed.
It was found that those committed from East
Texas received significantly longer sentences (x 2
= 20, p < .001) than those committed from West
Texas. It was also found that those committed
from "large city" counties (those having at least
one city of 50,000 or more population within its
boundaries) received significantly longer sentences
(X2 = 8.4, p < .01) than those committed from
"small city" counties.
Because of this inclination of juries to be influenced by these particular characteristics, those
possessing these characteristics will tend to receive
longer sentences than those not possessing them.
Bullock's data indicate that more Negroes than
whites fall into these categories for which juries
assess longer sentences. Thus even on the basis of
non-racial factors, Negroes are more likely to
receive more severe sentences than whites, simply
because they possess (to a much greater extent
than whites) the characteristics to which juries
assign stiffer sentences. However, even when these
non-racial characteristics are controlled, prisoners
receive differential treatment according to race.
Negro prisoners committed for murder received
significantly shorter sentences (x = 8.10, p <
.01) than their white counterparts, while those
Negroes imprisoned for burglary offenses received
significantly longer sentences (x2 = 14.45, p <
.001) than their white counterparts. Thus, to the
2 Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-racial
extent that we can accept Bullock's assumptions
27 SocIAL FoRces (1949) 369-81.
Hominides,
29Indictment, charge, and conviction percentages,
concerning the race of the victims, his findings
as well as the percentage of reductions in charges and indicate that NN murder cases are treated less
the length of sentences.
severely than WW murder cases, while NW bur30Bullock, supra note 1.
"looked at" a white woman. For the 645 cases
examined the hypothesis was generally supported.
That is, when the percent convicted, the percent
receiving death sentences, and the length of sentence are used as indicants, the order of severity of
treatment is that predicted: NW, WW, NN, WN.
Garfinkel,n using data for all homicides in
North Carolina between 1930 and 1940, improved
on Johnson's methodological approach by breaking
down murder into first and second degrees, as well
as by including manslaughters in the analysis and
using more dependent variables 9 on which to base
conclusions.
Garfinkel's analysis provides additional support
for Johnson's hypothesis. Virtually all independent
variablesr-indictment (the offense as it was defined by the Grand jury in its "True Bill"), charge,
conviction rate, and severity of sentence--support
the general proposition that defendants in NW
cases are dealt with most harshly, followed by
WW, NN, and WN. For example, of those convicted of first degree murder, 54% of the defendants in NW cases, 19% in WW cases, and 4% in
NN cases, and none of those in WN cases received
sentences of life imprisonment or death. Garfinkel's
is a much more compelling study than Johnson's.
The former uses a sample that is about 25% larger
than the latter's, and Garfinkel's tabular breakdowns of homicides by degrees, and his inclusions
of manslaughters provide a much more sophisticated and precise argument in support of the
hypothesis being tested.
More recently, Bullock"0 has tested the hypothesis that Negroes receive differential treatment in
our courts. In this study, however, the author
made the assumption that the crimes of murder
and rape are primarily intraracial and that the
crime ot burglary was interracial for Negro offenders and primarily intraracial for white offenders
(i.e., the victims of burglaries are primarily white).
If the patterns of the murders examined by Johnson and Garfinkel in North Carolina, Virginia, and
Georgia are comparable to those in Texas, Bullock's assumptions probably are not warranted in
about 10% of the cases. Bearing this limitation in
mind, let us examine the Bullock study.
Bullock analyzed data collected in 1958 from
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glary cases are treated more severely than WW p < .30; with two or more prior felony convictions,
burglary cases.
x2 = 5.9, p < .10).
In their Homicide in an Urban Cominunity,";
In a more recent study, Green" argues that the
Bensing and Schroeder examine 662 homicides that differences found in the treatment afforded white
occurred in the urban area of Greater Cleveland
and Negro offenders when the race of the victim
between 1947 and 1954. In examining the offender- was also considered may have been due to racial
victim dyads by race, Bensing and Schroeder found discrimination. He points out, however, that a
that there were some rather striking differences in growing body of evidence more convincingly
the handling of Negro and white defendants in indicates that:
intraracial cases. For example, far more Negroes
differential treatment is a product of the subthan whites (46% vs. 0%) are convicted as charged
cultural differences in patterns of crime resultin slayings involving a victim of the opposite race.
ing from enforced racial segregation. Rates of
While disparities of this size are glaring, the
the predominantly intra-racial offense of homiauthors found by looking more deeply, that differcide are consistently much higher for Negroes
ences between Negro and white offenders probably
compared with whites than can be accounted
accounted for a major part of the discrepancy. For
for merely by discriminatory law enforcement
example, among those convicted of first degree
practices. The greater proneness of the Negro
murder, it was found that in 74% of the NW cases
to resort to violence in responding to slights or
the defendant was also facing "one or more felony
settling disputes[ 51 coupled with a tendency
murder counts such as killing a police officer, killing
to carry "protective" weapons [ 6] subjects
while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate
him to a much greater risk than the white of
arson, robbery, burglary, or rape. Since only intent
slaying or being slain in an intra-racial brawl.
need be proved in felony murders, in theory, a
There is commonly a quality of intimacy in the
conviction should be easier to obtain than in cases
relationship between the principals in an inin which, in addition to intent to kill, premeditagroup homicide; the slaying of a Negro by a
tion and deliberation have to be proved beyond a
Negro is likely to be the culmination of an
reasonable doubt." 2 Differences in the circumaltercation between friends, lovers, or spouses.
stances of the NW as compared to the WN murAs Wolfgang points out in his discussion of
ders, and the fact that the disposition of the NN
the role of the victim in precipitating his own
and WW cases was strikingly similar led the
demise, the Negro victim much more freauthors to conclude that there was no evidence of
quently than the white victim, has provoked
racial discrimination.
the slayer to assault him. Since the killing
Edward Green, in his study of JudicialAttitudes
which resolves such a conflict is rarely
In Sentencing,33 touches on the factor of race and
premeditated, the legal element of "heat of
its effect on sentencing procedure in the criminal
passion" is more apt to be present, and the
court of Philadelphia. His data indicate that of
element of "intent to kill," problematic,
those sentenced (N = 333), Negro defendants
thereby mitigating the seriousness of the
received significantly more severe sentences than
offense.
did white defendants (x = 20.5, p < .01). HowThe circumstances surrounding the NW
ever, when the offense and the number of previous
homicides, on the other hand, are conditioned
felony convictions are held constant, there are no
by the social distance which characterizes
significant differences in the severity of sentences
race relations in the United States. The relagiven to white and Negro defendants for burglary
tively small percentage of interracial homicides
2
(with no prior felony convictions, X = 1.0, p <
in empirical studies attests to the slight proba.80; with one or more prior felony convictions,
bability of a fatal clash between white and
X = 4.9, p < .10), robbery (with one or no prior
34Green, Inter- and Intra-Racial Crime Relative to
felony convictions, X' = 1.1, p < .50), and theft
55 J. Cumi. L.C. & P.S. 348 (1964).
(with one or no prior felony convictions, x' = 2.8, Sentencing,
3"Wolfgang & Ferracuti, Subculture of Violence, An
Interpretive Analysis of Homicide, 1962 INT'L ANNALS
31BENSING & SCHROEDER, HOMCIDE IN AN URA-N or Can. 56.
3' Moses, Differentialsin Crime Rates Between Negroes
CounuNioy (1960).
32Id. at 52.
and Whites, 12 Am. Soc. R.v., 411 (1947); Schultz,
3GRaEN, J Dic.AL ATnrm)Es TowARD SEENcING
Why the Negro Carries Weapons, 53 J. Cans. L.C. &
56-63 (1961).
P.S. 476 (1962).

MICHAEL J. HINDELANG

Negro. [") A NW slaying is less likely than a
NN slaying to have arisen out of an altercation between intimates. Rather in most
instances the killing is an unpremeditated act
committed in the course of a predatory crime
such as robbery,R[3] thus automatically[391
elevating the offense to the level of first
40
degree murder.
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theoretical mean ("the value that would occur if

all cases of equivalent gravity, irrespective of race,
receive the same sentence") for the crimes of
robbery and burglary.43 Green's analysis strongly
argues that the variation in sentencing according
to the racial composition of the offender-victim
dyad exists as the result of legally relevant differences among the dyads, rather than as a result of
Based on this reasoning, Green hypothesizes that racial discrimination on behalf of the court.
Thus far, Vines and Jacob, Johnson, Garfinkel,
differences in the treatment of offenders attributed
to racial considerations by previous investigators, and Bullock have concluded that there is evidence
will be accounted for by non-racial differences of racial discrimination in our courts, while Green
among the four offender-victim categories for in two studies and Bensing and Schroeder have
which the statutes provide differential treatment. concluded that there is no evidence of racial
Or, as Green puts it, the hypothesis is that discrimination in our courts. What are some of
"patterns of criminal behavior constituting a given the differences between those studies finding
offense differ intrinsicallynot only between the races negative evidence of racial discrimination and
but within each race according to the race of the those studies finding positive evidence of racial
victim and that such differences are legally sufficient discrimination that may account for the discrepant
to account for the apparent racial differential in findings? Let us briefly examine four of these
sentencing." 4 Green's analysis shows that Negroes factors.
The four studies finding support for the hypothewith Negro victims are very different from Negroes
with white victims. The latter possess to a much sis that Negro offenders are treated differentially
greater extent those attributes for which the used data collected from southern statesPennsylvania statutes provide more severe Louisiana, North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia and
penalities. For example, the NW robberies when Texas; those studies finding no support for the
compared to the NN robberies are more often hypothesis used data collected from northern
states-Pennsylvania and Ohio. The implications
compounded by the fact that they are armed
robberies (61% vs. 13%), that they involve more of this difference between those studies finding
than one bill of indictment 42 (73% vs. 38%), and support and those studies finding no support for
that the defendant has prior convictions for robbery the hypothesis is obvious; stereotypical notions
or for felonies against the person (33% vs. 18%). of the differential treatment of Negroes in the
When the effects of these variables are partialled North vs. the South are sufficiently well-known to
out, a very different picture emerges. Although warrant their absence from our present discussion.
Secondly, those studies finding no support for
Green uses no statistical tests, the observed mean
the
hypothesis generally exercised much more care
length of sentence is virtually identical to the
in controlling for relevant non-racial variables in
7 WOLFGANG, PATTERNs iN CarunArL HomcmE
(1958); Johnson, supra note 27; Garfinkel, supra note their analyses. Interestingly, before these relevant
non-racial variables were controlled, it appeared as
28; BENSING & ScHROEDER, op. cit. supranote 31.
as In a study of homicide in Cleveland, Ohio, 20 out though the racial composition of the offenderof the 27 N-W first degree murder cases were fellony
murders. Bensing & Schroeder, op. cit. supra note 31. victim dyad were indeed exerting a significant
To warrant a conviction of felony murder it is unneces- influence on the decision. However, after the effects
sary to prove premeditation; proof of intent is sufficient. of some of the relevant non-racial
aspects of the
39Th character of the white versus white homicides,
it is thought, would be likely to vary according to the offense were partialled out, the evidence of dissocial class of the slayer and his victim. The lower class crimination disappeared. 44
pattern would correspond to the general run of the
A third difference between the first and second
NN slayings, crimes of passion predominating. The
middle class pattern would more often involve the groups of studies is that those studies finding
element of rational planning. See Wolfgang & Fer4
racuti, supranote 35.
3Id.
Tables 3 & 6.
40 Garfinkel supra note 28, at 349.
44 Green, ibid., found for example, the number of
41 Green, supranote 34, at 349-50.
previous felonies, whether the robbery offenses were
42The number of Bills of Indictment is the number
armed or unarmed, and the bills of indictment, to be
of separate and unconnected offenses for which the relevant nonracial factors that influenced the severity
defendant is convicted. Id. at 350.
of the sentence administered.

EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW

evidence of racial discrimination use data about
ten years older than those studies finding no
evidence of racial discrimination. Specifically,
Green's two studies use data on cases subsequent
to the 1954 Brown decision, while Johnson,
Garfinkel, and Bullock use data from cases, the
vast majority of which were decided prior to the
Brown decision."
Finally those studies finding support for the
hypothesis examined primarily homicides, while
those studies finding no support for the hypothesis
examined primarily property crimes."6
The dissonant findings of the two groups of
studies may be accounted for by geographical
and/or temporal considerations, in addition to
the types of crimes analyzed and/or the lack of
control of relevant non-racial variables. Although
Green's studies seem to have pretty well established
that in Philadelphia at least there is no evidence
of racial discrimination on the part of the court
within the crimes of burglary and robbery, more
4" There is one exception to this observation in each
group. Vines and Jacob, who found positive evidence,
used data for the years 1954-60. Bensing and Schroeder,
who found negative evidence, used data for the years
1947-53. It is possible that this may be accounted for
by the fact that the former used data from the South
while the latter used data from the North.
41Again, the findings of Vines and Jacob and Bensing
and Schroeder are at odds with this observation.

empirical work needs to be done before conclusions
with respect to homicide in the North and South,
and property crimes in the South can be drawn
and a statement regarding the presence or absence
of racial discrimination on the part of the court
can be made. Green's finding that non-racial
variables may account for the apparent, though
perhaps artifactual, discrimination that the lesscontrolled studies have unearthed has seriously
called into question the validity of the findings of
the earlier works. The wisest course of action would
seem to be to continue to study the problem,
controlling for the non-racial variables that Green
has found relevant, and searching for other
variables that may not be randomly distributed
among the offender-victim dyads.
If further analyses should indicate that discrimination on the part of the court does not exist, then
we should turn our efforts toward seeking equality
in more remote, but nonetheless essential spheres
of the adjudication process (e.g., providing competent lawyers and investigators for indigents). If,
however, inequities are uncovered in judicial
transactions, the court must resolve them so that
the rest of the nation and the world will have an
example of true equality on which to base individual transactions.

